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I. OPEN MEETINGS AND RECORDS
A. Open Meetings Act and Access to Government Facilities
Standing of the Press. For a short time during the survey period the right
of the press to challenge violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act' was
in question. In City ofAbilene v. Shacke/fordz the Eastland court of civil
appeals held that a reporter, newspaper, and television station had no
standing to sue under the Open Meetings Act and the Abilene City Char-
ter.
3
The Texas Supreme Court held that the reporter, Shackelford, had
standing to contest violations of the city charter, thus reversing this aspect
of the Eastland court's ruling. The supreme court did not specifically ad-
dress whether the corporate plaintiffs, the television station and newspa-
per, had standing under the city charter. The opinion repeatedly refers to
Shackelford as a citizen of Abilene with rights under the charter, but it
does not exclude the corporate plaintiffs from the holding. As the court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, which upheld the standing of all
plaintiffs, the assumption arises that the corporate plaintiffs also had stand-
ing to contest violations of the city charter.
The legislature overturned the Open Meetings Act aspect of Shackelford
by amending the Act to provide that "any interested person, including bona
fide members of the news media, may commence an action" to stop or pre-
vent violations of the Act.4 This amendment calls into question the status
of the press because only "bonafide members of the news media" are given
standing. Does "bona fide" include representatives of the underground
press?5 Does the lonely pamphleteer protected by the first amendment to
the United States Constitution have rights as a bona fide member of the
* A.B., Brown University; J.D., Boston University School of Law. Attorney at Law,
Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
i. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon 1970).
2. 572 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978), rev'd, 585 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1979).
3. Section 122 of the charter requires that "[a]ll meetings of the Council and all Boards
or Commissions appointed by the Council shall be open to the public." 572 S.W.2d at 744.
4. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (emphasis ad-
ded).
5. See Comment, Has Branzburg Buried the Underground Press, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 181 (1973).
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media? Some first amendment observers have opposed state legislation
giving the media special rights for fear that the problems inherent in defin-
ing the "press" will ultimately lead to state licensing of reporters.6
Although overshadowed by the controversy in Shackleford, the Beau-
mont court of appeals rendered a scholarly opinion in Enterprise Co. v. City
of Beaumont.' The Enterprise case involved whether a newspaper pub-
lisher had the right to attend collective bargaining sessions between the
city of Beaumont and a local voluntary association of firefighters. The
Employee Relations Act requires that such meetings be open to the pub-
lic.8 Again, the standing of the press to enforce this statute was challenged.
The Beaumont court held, however, that the newspaper publisher did have
standing. It followed the approach taken by the Houston (14th District)
court of appeals in Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Houston,9
which built upon a line of United States Supreme Court cases holding that
the press's right of access to governmental functions is coextensive with the
rights of the public.' ° As the public was expressly granted the right of
access by the Employee Relations Act, the Beaumont court held that the
publisher had the same right. Having found that the publisher could chal-
lenge a violation of the Employee Relations Act, the court issued an in-
junction prohibiting the plaintiff from being excluded from any meeting of
the defendants "wherein deliberations are to be conducted pertaining to
collective bargining [sic] between them. . . or any joint meetings held by
the parties."" It went on to hold that separate meetings between the col-
lective bargainer and the parties were exempt from the public meeting re-
quirement.
Access to Government Officials and Facilities. One of the more unusual
cases decided during the survey period, Southwestern Newspapers Corp. v.
Curtis,'2 involved Potter County district attorney Tom Curtis. Three
Amarillo newspapers alleged that Curtis became piqued over adverse pub-
licity in the three papers and retaliated by imposing restrictions upon re-
porters' access to the district attorney's office. These restrictions were
imposed only upon the three newspapers and not upon other members of
the press. The trial court found that the plaintiffs had met all of the re-
quirements for a preliminary injunction save a showing of irreparable in-
jury. The Amarillo court of appeals reversed, predictably holding that if
6. See Symposium on the Press Clause, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 559 (1979). See also Stew-
art, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
7. 574 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
8. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c, § 7(e) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
9. 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston f 14th Dist.] 1975), writ refd n.r.e. per
curiam, 536 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1976).
10. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (press right of access not supe-
rior to general public); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (state regulation barring inter-
views between newsmen and prison inmates upheld); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S.
843 (1974) (Bureau of Prisons policy statement barring inmate news interviews upheld).
11. 574 S.W.2d at 791-92.
12. 584 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ). See also Curtis v.
Nobles, 588 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
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access to some media is granted, that access must be equal and, within
reasonable limits, there must be access with equal convenience to official
news sources such as a district attorney and his staff.
There is a dictum in the Curtis case, however, that is important. The
Amarillo court of appeals stated that, absent some compelling governmen-
tal interest, access to public officials and their places of work must be
granted to the press and, once granted, administered equally. There is
some support for this theory, found primarily in Houston Chronicle Pub-
lishing Co. v. City of Houston. 3 In that case the court found that under the
first amendment the public has a constitutional right to certain records
even though such records are not available under the state Open Records
Act.' 4 The court reasoned that, as the public and press have coextensive
rights to such information, the media should also be able to obtain the
data. The same analysis may be made in giving the public and the press
access to government employees and buildings under the first amendment
or article one, section eight, of the Texas Constitution. The public's right
of access to government under the petition, speech, and press clauses of the
first amendment is relatively undeveloped. To the extent the Curtis case
signals an extension of the Houston Chronicle case, it will bear watching.
B. Open Records Act and Access to Information
Legislation Affecting Public Disclosure of Information. Three amendments
to the Open Records Act were passed by the Sixty-sixth Legislature. One
of the amendments, providing for attorneys' fees to successful private liti-
gants in Open Records Act litigation, was vetoed by Governor Clements. 15
The Governor did sign legislation, however, that exempted from the Open
Records Act the home addresses and telephone numbers of peace of-
ficers. ' 6
The Governor also signed legislation that amended section 10 of the
Open Records Act to provide that a custodian of public records, or his
agent, violates the Act if, "with criminal negligence, he or his agent fails or
refuses to give access to, or to permit or provide copying of, public records
to any person upon request as provided in this Act."' 7 The offense is
classed as a misdemeanor punishable by a jail term not to exceed six
months, or a fine not to exceed $1,000, or both.' 8 There are, however,
several affirmative defenses to prosecution under section 10. If the custo-
dian, because of his reasonable reliance upon a court order or a written
interpretation of the Act by either a court or the attorney general, reason-
ably believed that the public records were not required to be made avail-
13. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
14. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
15. S.B. 1025, 66th Legis. (1979); see Clements Vetoes Records Bill, Austin-Am. States-
man, May 19, 1979, at B2, col. 1.
16. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(17) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
17. Id. § 10(b).
18. Id. § 10(e).
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able, a defense is provided.' 9 The custodian may also defend by asserting
that a decision from the attorney general was requested pursuant to the
Act and is still pending, or that an action was filed seeking relief from
compliance with the attorney general's decision.2" If an agent of the custo-
dian is prosecuted, it is an affirmative defense that he reasonably relied
upon written nondisclosure instructions of the custodian of the public
records.2'
The legislature exercised its authority to designate specific records as
either public or confidential on several occasions in the past session. Thus,
by the addition of section 46.006 to the Human Resources Code, "[a]l files
and records on recipients of benefits provided under [the child support
section of the Human Resources Code] and on an alleged father of an
illegitimate child are confidential. '22 The legislature also created a new
exception for designated hospital records that directly or indirectly identify
a patient, former patient, or proposed patient as defined in the Texas
Mental Health Code.23 The amendment allows disclosure of a deceased
patient's records if consent is given by the executor or administrator of his
estate, the surviving spouse, or, if no spouse survives, a relative within the
first degree of consanguinity.24
An amendment to article 6252-9b provides that the public should have
access to the financial statements of state officers and that the secretary of
state must maintain the statements and affidavits as required under the
article in a place accessible to the public during regular office hours. Every
requester of information is required to file with the secretary of state his
name, address, the person whom he represents, and the date of the re-
quest.
25
In amending the State Bar Act, 26 the legislature made all records of the
state bar, with two major exceptions, subject to the Open Records Act.
The first exception encompasses records relating to grievances, while the
second concerns records pertaining to the Texas Board of Legal Specializa-
tion.27 The state bar will be governed by a board of directors whose meet-
ings shall be conducted in compliance with the Open Meetings Act.28
Bank Examination Reports. The Texas Supreme Court in Stewart v. Mc-
Cain29 held that information obtained by the Banking Department rela-
tive to the financial condition of state banks is confidential and that an
absolute privilege against disclosure is provided by the Texas Banking
19. 1d. § 10(c)(I).
20. Id. §§ 10(c)(2)-(3).
21. Id. § 10(d).
22. TEX. HUMAN RESOURCES CODE ANN. § 46.006 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1979).
23. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-87 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
24. Id. art. 5547-87(a)(1).
25. Id. art. 6252-9b.
26. Id. art. 320a-1.
27. Id. § 9(f).
28. Id. § 9(a).
29. 575 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1978).
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Code.3" The information, a bank examiner's interoffice memorandum to
the Banking Commission, was sought pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum
in a pending civil law suit. The court noted that the examiner's formal
report was available to the parties and emphasized the need for confidenti-
ality in the Banking Department's internal communications that are based
on the examiner's opinions and impressions.3" Without prior judicial pre-
cedent, the court relied on an opinion of the attorney general and con-
cluded that such information should remain confidential.32
Attorney General Opinions. There were twenty formal open record deci-
sions issued by the attorney general during the survey period. The follow-
ing are the more important decisions.
1. In ORD-208 the attorney general held that the names of complainants
who filed formal complaints with the police department's internal affairs
division are public information and are required to be disclosed.33 Fur-
thermore, the name of the officer who is the subject of the complaint and
the final disposition of the complaint by the city police department are also
public information.34
2. In ORD-209 the individual written comments and portions of a con-
sultant's report of an opinion survey of Richardson Inde Pendent School
District employees were held excepted from disclosure.3 The attorney
general stated that the comments were more in the nature of opinion ad-
vice and recommendation than factual information and thus were ex-
empt.36 The remaining portions of the survey concerning questions asking
for an objective response were held to be public.37
3. In ORD-210 the attorney general held that a school superintendent is
entitled to see documents presented to the school board outlining charges
against him. 38 The superintendent, however, was held not to have the
right to examine correspondence between the board and its attorneys con-
cerning the matter.39
4. In ORD-211 the attorney general held that all information contained
in the audit working papers of the auditor of the Texas Commission on
Jail Standards and of the attorney general's Organized Crime Task Force
that was not specified as excepted was public information.'
5. In a letter to the attorney general, Governor Briscoe requested an
opinion on whether a letter of recommendation concerning a potential gu-
bernatorial appointment is per se excepted from required public disclo-
30. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-210 (Vernon 1973).
31. 575 S.W.2d at 511.
32. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-147 (1976).
33. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-208 (1978).
34. Id. at 2.
35. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-209 (1978).
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
38. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-210 (1978).
39. Id. at 2.
40. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-211 (1978).
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sure. In ORD-212 the attorney general held that it was not.4 1 In
particular instances, however, when a factual showing of significant poten-
tial infringement of first amendment rights of association and belief is
made, such recommendations might be excepted by a constitutional right
of privacy.42 Information contained in a particular letter would not be
excepted under a common law right of privacy, unless it was highly inti-
mate or embarrassing and would be highly objectionable to a reasonable
person, and the information was not of legitimate concern to the public. 3
The attorney general stated that specific letters of recommendation for an
appointment thought to be excepted from disclosure should be submitted
to the attorney general for an in camera inspection and determination of
whether and to what extent the information may be withheld."
6. In ORD-213 the attorney general determined that the portions of the
operational audit of the Humanities Research Center of the University of
Texas at Austin that are labeled and contain "recommendations" are ex-
cepted from disclosure.45 In addition, the attorney general stated that the
remainder of the audit should be disclosed.46
7. In ORD-215 the attorney general held that a deceased individual has
no right of privacy. 47 Therefore, a licensing file retained by the Texas
State Board of Medical Examiners is not excepted from disclosure when
the individual who is the subject of the file is deceased.48
8. The attorney general consolidated three requests for opinions concern-
ing whether a closed investigative report is public under the Open Records
Act. The response to these requests, ORD-216, held that a report of an
explosion and fire was excepted from disclosure to the extent that the in-
formation concerned inquiries and responses about the criminal history
record of the deceased victim.4 9 In all other respects the information was
said to be public.5 ° In addition, a city fire marshall's report of an investi-
gation of a fire accident that injured a spectator at a football game was
held to be public.5 Finally, the report of an investigation by a Texas
Ranger into allegations of sexual misconduct between employees and stu-
dents at the Gibbons State School was held excepted from disclosure, be-
cause it would disclose law enforcement information obtained under a
promise of confidentiality. 2
9. Touche Ross & Company submitted a proposal to conduct an audit of
the Criminal Justice Division of the Governor's Office. In ORD-217 the
41. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-212 (1978).
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-213 (1978).
46. Id. at 2-3.
47. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-215 (1978). See also TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-917
(1976).
48. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-215 (1978).
49. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-216 (1978).





attorney general held that the preliminary work program for the audit was
excepted from public disclosure as a trade secret pursuant to exception
3(a)(10) of the Open Records Act.53
10. Price Waterhouse & Company conducted a special audit of the Dal-
las Independent School District concerning the procedures for purchasing
certain materials. In ORD-219 the attorney general held that the majority
of the audit report was public, but that two pages entitled "Recommenda-
tions to Improve Procedures Surrounding the Solicitation of Bids and
Award of Contracts" were excepted from disclosure as an intra-agency
memorandum making policy recommendations.54
11. In ORD-220 the attorney general held that the records of a bank ac-
count, alleged to be a private account of an individual but opened in the
name of a city, are not excepted from disclosure.55 The attorney general
stated that there was a substantial public interest and legitimate concern
with the information that outweighed any privacy interest in the informa-
tion.5 6
12. In ORD-221 the attorney general held that the minutes of the
Pasadena Independent School Board from 1950 until the present were not
excepted from public disclosure.57 A claim that the records were exempt
from disclosure because the minutes in part related to litigation in which a
governmental body was, or may be, involved was insufficient to suppress
the records.58
13. In ORD-222 the attorney general ruled that most of a report of a
private consulting firm's study of possible site locations for a sludgetreat-
ment plant was public.59 The attorney general excepted from disclosure
only one page entitled "Recommendation," which was found to be ex-
cepted pursuant to section 3(a)(l 1).60
14. In ORD-223 the attorney general decided that the names of appli-
cants for the position of school superintendent were "not required to be
revealed where the applicant is able to demonstrate that release of his
name is likely to have an adverse effect on his current employment."'"
The attorney general required the district to make such a determination
and stated that if an adverse effect on current employment was shown, the
names need not be revealed.62 The attorney general held that such infor-
mation concerning an identifiable individual's application for employment
is excepted as being "information in personnel files."63
15. The University of Texas requested an opinion of the attorney gen-
53. TEX. ATT'v GEN. ORD-217 (1978).
54. TEX. ATr'v GEN. ORD-219 (1978).
55. TEX. AT-r' GEN. ORD-220 (1978).
56. Id. at 2.
57. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-221 (1979).
58. Id.
59. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-222 (1979).
60. Id. at 3.
61. TEX. Arr'v GEN. ORD-223 (1979).
62. Id. at 3.
63. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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eral, seeking to determine whether handwritten student evaluations of
faculty members are public under the Open Records Act. In ORD-224 the
attorney general held that the evaluations were excepted from required
public disclosure.'
16. In ORD-225 the attorney general determined that the handwritten
notes of a meeting made by the secretary of a governmental body were
public under the Open Records Act and that typewritten minutes were
public prior to approval by the governmental body.65
17. In ORD-226 the attorney general indicated that monthly and annual
financial statements and all other documents reflecting income and ex-
penses submitted to Ecktor County by the lessee operator of the county




Texas Election Code. In Beck v. Texas67 a broad constitutional attack was
launched upon the Political Funds Reporting and Disclosure Act.68 The
petitioner was convicted of failing to comply with the reporting require-
ments of the Act and was sentenced to thirty days in jail and a $1,000 fine.
The court of criminal appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Act, hold-
ing that it (1) was not void for vagueness, (2) did not violate freedom of
speech, association, or associational privacy, (3) did not deny petitioner
equal protection of the law, and (4) did not violate the state constitutional
requirement that subjects embraced in the Act must be expressed in the
title.6 9
Another attempt to test the constitutionality of the Election Code, arti-
cles 9.09 through 9.12, failed in Vela v. Texas.7° The court of criminal
appeals held that constitutional defenses must be pleaded or presented to
the trial court. Failure to do so precludes them from being raised for the
first time on appeal.
City Charters. In a case involving a constitutional challenge to a city char-
ter a writ of mandamus was granted by the trial court and affirmed on
appeal requiring the secretary of the city of Denton to accept a recall peti-
tion. The Fort Worth court of civil appeals held that the recall petition
should be accepted and also ruled that the Denton Charter as applied by
the city secretary was unconstitutional under article 6, section 1 of the
Texas Constitution.7' The secretary refused to accept an amended recall
64. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-224 (1979).
65. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-225 (1979).
66. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-226 (1979).
67. 583 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
68. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon 1967).
69. 583 S.W.2d at 343-46.
70. 572 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
71. Holt v. Trantham, 575 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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petition, which was modified only to add the affidavits of petition circula-
tors, because it failed to state new grounds for recall. The court was care-
ful to limit its finding of a constitutional violation to the facts of the case
and thus did not find the provision defective on its face.
B. Construction of the Election Code
The right of a candidate to have his name printed on the official ballot
as an independent candidate is governed by article 13.50 of the Election
Code. The San Antonio court of civil appeals held in Tyler v. Cook7 2 that
the signatures on the independent candidates' petitions could be obtained
prior to the primary election. The Texas Supreme Court, in effect, re-
versed that ruling two days later, holding that the provisions of article
13.50 require that the petitions be signed only after the primary election.7 3
This, the court held, was the plain intent of the legislature, which in sub-
section four of the statute provided: "[n]o person who has voted at either
the general primary election or the runoff primary election of any party
shall sign an application in favor of anyone for an office for which a nomi-
nation was made at either such primary election."74
The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the address provision
of article 13.50 was met. The lower court had ruled that in a rural county a
description of the signers' addresses by box number, post office box, or
general delivery was sufficient. The Act merely requires that, "[iun addi-
tion to the person's signature, the application shall show each signer's ad-
dress, the number of his voter registration certificate, and the date of
signing."75
In Vela v. Texas76 the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals considered
whether the bonding exception of article 9.0977 applies to municipal elec-
tions. The court held that the provisions of articles 9.09 through 9.12 apply
to municipal elections and that only exceptions expressly provided in the
statute were applicable. Vela involved an appeal from a contest of the
mayoral election in the city of Hidalgo and a quo warranto proceeding.
The incumbent, Eduardo Vela, was declared the winner by a one-vote
margin over Enedina Garza, who filed an election contest in the district
court of Hidalgo County. Vela, as contestee, did not file a bond under
article 9.09 within twenty days of notice of the contest. As provided in
article 9.10, however, Garza did file a bond. The Governor thereafter is-
sued a commission appointing Garza to the office of mayor. Vela refused
to relinquish his office of mayor and, therefore, Garza and the district at-
torney filed the quo warranto action to remove Vela from office. This pro-
ceeding and the election contest were consolidated for trial. The trial court
found that the election was void because it was impossible to ascertain the
72. 573 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), rev'd, 576 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1978).
73. 576 S.W.2d at 770.
74. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.50, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
75. Id. § 5.
76. 572 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
77. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 9.09 (Vernon 1967).
1980l
SOUTHWESTERN LA4W JOURNAL
true results and that Garza was entitled to hold the office of mayor until a
new election was held.
The Election Code provides that the contestee may file a bond within
twenty days after service of notice of the contest upon him78 and that, if he
fails to do so, the contestant shall have the right, within ten days, to file a
like bond payable to the contestee.79 If the contestant does file the bond,
then the clerk shall notify the Governor8" and, upon receipt of the notifica-
tion from the clerk, the Governor shall issue a commission to the contest-
ant for the office in controversy pending the election contest.8 Vela
argued on appeal that these provisions were inapllicable to this election,
because article 9.06, concerning notice of the contest to the district court,
does not refer to municipal elections and because article 8.45 does not give
the Governor authority to commission municipal officers. The court of
appeals rejected these arguments, holding that only legislative contests
were exempt from the bonding requirements,82 that section 9.06 does not
act to exclude municipal elections from consideration by the district courts,
and that section 8.45 does not preclude the authority of the Governor to
grant commissions to a contestant in a municipal election.83
In Roberts v. Brownsborough Independent School District84 a group of
taxpayers brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to avoid an order
passed by the school district calling for a school bond election. The chal-
lenge to the election was based on the district's failure to comply with the
Texas Open Meetings Act. The trial court found that, although couched in
terms of a declaratory judgment action, the suit was in substance an attack
on the validity of the bond election and as such amounted to an election
contest. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to give notice of their
intention to contest the election within the thirty-day period prescribed by
article 9.03 and, therefore, it had no jurisdiction to determine the election
contest.
The Tyler court affirmed, interpreting the Election Code to mean that
the term "election contest" includes any type of suit concerning the valid-
ity of an election or the elective process.85 The court went on to find that
the giving of thirty days' notice is a mandatory prerequisite to an election
contest. The Tyler court of civil appeals thus agreed that there was no
jurisdiction to consider the suit and that the question under the Open
Meetings Act could not be reached.
In Frias v. Board of Trustees86 the El Paso court of civil appeals upheld
the right of a corporation to donate money to promote passage of a school
bond issue. The contestants of the school bond election argued that a po-
78. Id.
79. Id. art. 9.10.
80. Id. art. 9.11.
81. Id. art. 9.12.
82. 572 S.W.2d at 130.
83. Id. at 132.
84. 575 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ dism'd).
85. Id. at 374.
86. 584 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
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litical committee had received contributions from several corporations,
thus violating article 14.06 of the Texas Election Code.87 Without express-
ly finding such a violation, the court held that if article 14.06 were con-
strued to prohibit such contributions, then the law would be
unconstitutional. 8 It relied upon the United States Supreme Court's rul-
ing in First National Bank v. Bellotti89 and an opinion of the Texas attor-
ney general.90
Villarreal v. Hedrick9 concerned an election contest filed in Kleberg
County in which a candidate for county commissioner, who was initially
declared the winner but later lost on a recount, filed an action. The
Corpus Christi court of civil appeals found that it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial judge to reopen the ballot boxes and recount the
ballots in light of the evidence of irregularities.92 The court noted the
broad scope of judicial inquiry in election contests and followed the tradi-
tional rule by upholding the trial court's actions in the absence of clear
evidence of abuse of discretion.93
In Williamson v. Kempp 4 the Texarkana court of civil appeals affirmed
the issuance of a writ of mandamus issued by the trial court requiring an
election judge to certify the results of a school board election. The trial
and appellate courts determined that certifying the results of an election is
a purely ministerial act under the Texas Election Code and should have
been performed notwithstanding that the election judge thought fraud had
occurred in the election.95 The appellate court upheld the issuance of a
writ to the board of trustees of the school district requiring them to canvass
the returns as provided in section 23.10 of the Texas Education Code.96
The court held that once the election process has been initiated, it must be
concluded, at which time a dissatisfied party can file suit to contest the
87. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1406 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
88. 584 S.W.2d at 948.
89. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (statute prohibiting corporate contributions in referendum elec-
tions held abridgment of first amendment). See Note, Corporations' Right to Free Speech in
Referendum Elections. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 32 Sw. L.J. 1359 (1979).
90. TEX. ATT'v GEN. Op. No. H-1 175 (1978) (article 14.06 corporate contribution pro-
hibition unconstitutional).
91. 579 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ dism'd).
92. 1d. at 45-46.
93. Id. The court did not elaborate on what it might consider an abuse of discretion,
although it did cite one case that overruled a trial court's election contest judgment due to
such abuse. See Sewell v. Chambers, 209 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948,
no writ) (where abundant evidence of fraud, trial judge abused discretion in refusing to
require recount). Texas appellate courts generally allow trial courts broad discretion in elec-
tion investigations. Little v. Alto Independent School Dist., 513 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1974, writ dism'd) (where irregularities would not change outcome of election,
trial court did not abuse discretion by ignoring); Vicars v. Stokley, 296 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956), writ refdn.r.e per curiam, 300 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1957) (not
abuse of discretion to allow amendment of pleadings to conform to proof of irregularities
found when ballot box opened).
94. 574 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
95. Id. at 847.
96. Id.
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election.97
C. Voting Rights Act
Although deciding a question of federal law, the recent case of Heggins
v. City of Dallas98 is important for its potential impact on city election
plans in Texas. In Heggins a three-judge panel held that a pending elec-
tion for the city council of Dallas was covered by the Voting Rights Act of
1965. 99 Over the strong dissent of Judge Robert M. Hill, the court en-
joined the city from conducting the elections until it could do so in compli-
ance with the Voting Rights Act. Although the coverage question was
decided unanimously, Judge Hill dissented on the question of injunctive
relief, observing that such relief was by no means mandatory and should
be denied. The majority had determined that an injunction was the "nor-
mal remedy" and should be departed from only when the plaintiff brought
a suit on the eve of the election.' Judge Hill identified three factors that
he thought should be considered by courts in deciding whether to grant an
injunction. First, a court should consider the potential prejudice to the
voting rights of racial minorities.' Secondly, the court should consider
whether the city has "unduly delayed in seeking approval of changes in its
election laws."'0 2 Thirdly, the court should determine whether the politi-
cal subdivision has changed its election procedures to evade constitutional
review.' '3 Judge Hill found that by applying these three criteria to the
Dallas election the injunction should not have been granted. Since the
date of the Heggins decision, the city of Dallas and the Department of
Justice have settled upon a compromise plan for electing members to the
city council, and the injunction has been dissolved."0
III. ZONING
There were a number of decisions 0 5 during the survey period reaffirm-
ing well-established principles of zoning law. Some unusual issues arose,
however, in Southern National Bank v. City ofAustin, 0 6 in which the Tyler
97. Id. at 848.
98. 469 F. Supp. 739 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (three-judge court).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
100. 469 F. Supp. at 742-43.
101. Id. at 746.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 747.
104. Heggins v. City of Dallas, No. CA3-79-0118-E (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 1979) (order
dissolving three-judge court and injunction).
105. See, e.g., Board of Adjustment v. Nelson, 584 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam)
(manufacturing activities of sign company ceased, thus property owner abandoned noncon-
forming use of property that had been annexed and zoned residential); Conway v. Hospital
Corp. of Am., 577 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (ordi-
nance changing zoning classification from single family residential and agricultural to hospi-
tal not unreasonable); Currey v. Kimple, 577 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978,
writ refd n.r.e.) (tennis court held to be within primary use of property as residential dwell-
ing). For an interesting discussion of conditional zoning, see Note, Conditional Zoning in
Texas, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 829 (1979).
106. 582 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
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court of civil appeals struck down as unconstitutional a city code provision
dealing with the procedure for obtaining building permits, removal per-
mits, and demolition permits, and for altering the exterior of a building
during the pendency of consideration of that building as an historic
landmark. The specific code provision called into question was the histori-
cal preservation ordinance of the city of Austin.
In 1974, the city of Austin added a new article to the city code entitled
Historic Landmark Preservation and created a commission known as the
Historic Landmark Commission. Pursuant to its authority under the code,
the Landmark Commission sought to have the southern portion of the fa-
mous Driskill Hotel zoned as commercial-historic. The City Council en-
acted a zoning ordinance relating to the southern portion of the hotel and
thus triggered certain city code provisions dealing with preservation and
upkeep of historical landmarks.
The trial court, in a proceeding brought by the owners of the hotel, held
that the ordinance that applied to zone the older section of the Driskill
Hotel as an historical landmark was unlawful as it violated the United
States and Texas Constitutions. No appeal was taken from that action of
the trial court. The trial court, however, also denied all other requests for
declaratory relief, including a prayer that the court permanently enjoin the
city from enforcing the Historic Landmark Preservation Code provisions.
Thus, the Tyler court of appeals was faced with a constitutional challenge
of the entire statutory scheme. The court held that the section dealing with
procedures for obtaining building permits, removal permits, demolition
permits, and for altering the exterior of a building or structure during pen-
dency of consideration of the building or structure as an historic landmark
or as a part of an historic landmark was constitutionally defective. The
code allowed the Landmark Commission to recommend to the city council
that property be designated as an historic landmark. Once property was
placed on the commission's agenda, it would become subject to restrictions
on modification, removal, or demolition for up to sixty days. If the prop-
erty was recommended by the commission, it could be "frozen" indefi-
nitely until the city council made its decision. The court found that this
scheme acted to deprive property owners "of their property without due
process as well as depriving them of the equal protection of the laws, be-
cause it fails to provide a reasonable time limit on final City Council ac-
tion after a parcel of property has been listed on the agenda of the
Landmark Commission."' 7 The court found that the section was defec-
tive in that it provided no standards to guide the persons authorized to
place the section's restrictions on landowners merely by listing the land-
owners' property on the commission's agenda. The court further specifi-
cally invalidated the provision as it applied to the plaintiffs property.




The ability of Texas cities to regulate a wide variety of activities was
challenged during the survey period."°8 Dubuisson v. Texas °9 involved
the attempt of the city of San Antonio to regulate establishments where
striptease is performed. A city ordinance prohibited an entertainer or a
performer employed in an establishment in which food or beverage is sold
and where a striptease act is conducted from mingling with any patron or
spectator for any purpose. In addition, the ordinance declared it unlawful
for an employee of such an establishment to solicit a patron to purchase
food or beverage either for the one soliciting or for another employee."°
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that "the ordinance must
stand or fall solely on the basis of the city's general police power, delegated
to it by the State to reasonably regulate activities relating to the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizenry.""' The ordinance drew no support
from the twenty-first amendment of the United States Constitution, which
grants power to regulate activities in establishments in which intoxicating
liquors are sold, because the ordinance was not restricted to such establish-
ments. ' 12
The court found that the ordinance significantly impinged upon the
speech and associational rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the
United States Constitution. Where such interests are at stake, the court
held, a compelling state interest must be present to overcome the interests
guaranteed by the first amendment. The court decided that the interest
sought to be protected, while laudable, was not compelling. It was, how-
ever, at pains to note that the ordinance was loosely drawn and that a more
precise, clear, and narrow ordinance might pass constitutional muster.
In John v. Texas' '. the validity of an Arlington city code provision regu-
lating sales on the grounds of municipally-owned property was tested. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals restated the rule that a city's police pow-
ers extend to the reasonable protection of the public health, safety, and
welfare. It went on to hold that the city had a legitimate interest in regu-
lating traffic upon city-owned property and that this interest could be fur-
108. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm'n, 584 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1979, no writ) (cities have no inherent power to regulate rates of public utilities);
Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 578 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (municipalities may grant franchises to utilities to use public
streets and alleys but such franchises do not grant the right to engage in sale of electricity to
the public).
109. 572 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
110. The express purpose of the act was to protect patrons of San Antonio nightclubs
from being victimized by employees of these establishments. Id. at 697-98, 697 n.5.
I 1. Id. at 697.
112. The court quoted California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), in which the Supreme
Court indicated that the twenty-first amendment created a power broader than the normal
state authority over public morals to regulate establishments licensed to sell alcoholic li-
quors. 572 S.W.2d at 697. The overbreadth of the ordinance in constraining first amend-
ment protected speech may have rendered the provision constitutionally unenforceable even
with twenty-first amendment support.
113. 577 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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thered by enacting an ordinance prohibiting the sale of goods or services
on such property. Thus, the court ruled that the ordinance was a proper
exercise of the police power delegated to the city by the Texas Constitu-
tion. The appellant, John, also attacked the ordinance on constitutional
equal protection grounds, because it contained an exception for persons
who had contracted with the city to engage in sales on city property. The
court noted that the class so established was not unreasonable or arbitrary
considering the city's legitimate aim in regulating the number of vendors
in areas where large crowds congregate.' '
In Jones v. Odessa"5 the El Paso court of civil appeals found that the
Odessa City Charter, which gave the city council power to "establish all
necessary rules and regulations protecting the health" of the residents of
the city and also "to define all nuisances and prohibit the same within the
City," supported the enactment of an ordinance for the destruction of
buildings that are a "fire hazard," or "dangerous to human life."' 6 In
Utter v. Texas' the court of criminal appeals upheld a city ordinance
requiring a permit for the operation of a wrecker in the city in the face of
alleged unconstitutionality because of a conflict with state statutory provi-
sions regulating the wrecker industry. The court found no such conflict
and therefore upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance." 18 It also re-
jected the argument that the license fee collected pursuant to the ordinance
was an occupational tax prohibited by state law.' '9 The court, applying
the usual test of determining whether the ordinance was principally for the
raising of revenue or whether its primary purpose was to regulate, found
that it was a purely regulatory ordinance.' 2 °
V. INCORPORATION
Durham v. Crutchfield2' involved a suit brought by private parties at-
tacking the validity of the incorporation of the town of Sun Valley. The
Texarkana court of civil appeals held that a quo warranto proceeding
brought by the state is the only method of making a direct attack upon a
voidable municipal corporation; private parties lack standing to attack di-
rectly the existence and organization of a municipal corporation. 122 The
court went on to say, however, that private citizens may attack a void in-
corporation in certain instances, such as where the act of incorporation
itself is either prohibited or unauthorized by law.' 23 In Durham the plain-
tiffs were unable to demonstrate that the incorporation was void or that
114. Id. at 485-86. The court observed that the appellant had never attempted to join the
class himself by contracting with the city. Id. at 485 n. I.
115. 574 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
116. Id. at 853.
117. 571 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
118. Id. at 936.
119. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6698 (Vernon 1977).
120. 571 S.W.2d at 937,
121. 578 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
122. Id. at 440.
123. Id. at 441.
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they suffered direct injury as the result of a voidable incorporation. As the
State of Texas was not a party to the lawsuit and because private citizens
cannot compel the state to become a party to their suit or to file a quo
warranto proceeding in their behalf, the court held that there was no juris-
diction, the case was dismissed, and the trial court judgment was af-
firmed. 12
4
VI. ANNEXATION AND DISANNEXATION
A. Annexation
The Supreme Court of Texas decided only one annexation case during
the survey period. In State ex rel McWilliams v. Town of Oak Point'25 the
supreme court affirmed the Fort Worth court of civil appeals holding that
an inhabitant of a territory sought to be annexed under the provisions of
article 974126 must be a "registered voter" in order to vote in an annexa-
tion election. The statute does not expressly mention registration, but the
court interpreted the requirement that annexation voters be "qualified to
vote for members of the State Legislature" to mean that such voters must
be registered and not merely eligible to register. 127
In Sabine Offshore Service Co. v. City of Port Arthur 28 the Beaumont
court of civil appeals decided whether a city annexing territory must as-
sume responsibility for providing water to all the users within the annexed
territory, including businesses selling large amounts of water to offshore
drillers. The court held that when the city of Port Arthur annexed the
Sabine Pass area it assumed the responsibility of providing water to all
users, but only if the demand for such water was reasonable and within the
capacity of Port Arthur. The court held the municipality could refuse to
supply water in the amount requested provided its decision was not dis-
criminatory. As the court found no discrimination against Sabine Offshore
Service, it affirmed the judgment for the city.
The extent and effect of articles 1183 through 1187,129 which allow cities
on navigable streams to extend their city limits within certain boundaries
for the limited purposes of aiding navigation and wharves, was called into
question in City of Nassau Bay v. Winograd.130 Pursuant to an annexation
of property, the city of Nassau Bay brought into its jurisdiction a navigable
stream known as Cow Bayou or Carlton Lagoon. Dr. Winograd had prop-
erty adjacent to the lagoon. The controversy arose when Nassau Bay be-
gan to require that Winograd comply with all of its general regulatory
124. Id. at 442.
125. 579 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. 1979).
126. Article 974 provides in part that "a majority of the inhabitants qualified to vote for
members of the State legislature of any territory adjoining the limits of any city incorporated
under, or accepting the provisions of, this title" may vote for annexation of the territory to
the city. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 974 (Vernon 1963).
127. 579 S.W.2d at 463.
128. 582 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
129. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1183-1187 (Vernon 1963).
130. 582 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ordinances. Nassau Bay contended that its right of general regulatory con-
trol over Winograd was conferred by article 1186.3" Winograd argued
that articles 1183 through 1187 were for the more limited purpose of an-
nexation to promote and regulate navigation and wharfage and did not
require him to comply with the general regulatory control of the city. The
court of appeals recognized the limited scope of the statutes and held that
the city's annexation of Winograd's land did not give it general regulatory
control over that land.
In City of Missouri City v. Senior'32 the Houston (1st District) court of
civil appeals upheld the right of private parties to attack collaterally an
annexation ordinance if the parties are directly affected by the ordinance
and it is void ab initio. The court also considered the legislature's well-
recognized power to validate an act of annexation that does not meet with
traditional requirements of the Municipal Annexation Act.' 33 It ruled,
however, that the legislature must evidence a clear intention to validate an
ordinance that fails to comply with the Act.' 34 The appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's voiding of two Missouri City annexation ordi-
nances, finding that the purported annexation had not been in compliance
with state statutes' 35 and that the dispute was subsequent to validating
state legislation. 136
In City of Houston v. Moody'37 a water control district was annexed by
the city of Houston. Creditors of the water control district brought suit
against the city on certain debts incurred prior to annexation and were
awarded a judgment in the lower court but were denied attorneys' fees.
The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that the city
had an equitable obligation to make restitution.' 38 The appellate court
also upheld the denial of attorneys' fees. 13
9
In City of Forney v. Estate of J W Pinson'40 certain landowners sought
to have four 1960 annexation ordinances declared invalid. The trial court
declared the ordinances unconstitutional, and the Texarkana court of civil
appeals affirmed. Although stipulating that portions of the four ordi-
nances were unconstitutional, the city of Forney urged that the illegal por-
tions of the ordinance should be severed from the remaining portions, thus
131. Article 1186 provides that after passage of an annexation ordinance, the city "shall
have and exercise the fullest and most complete power of regulation of navigation and of
wharfage. . . and shall further have authority by criminal ordinances or otherwise, to po-
lice the navigation of said waters and the use of said wharves. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1186 (Vernon 1963).
132. 583 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
133. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 970a (Vernon 1963 & Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
134. 583 S.W.2d at 448.
135. The annexation ordinance contained an incorrect description of the annexed lands
and was thus void ab initio. Id. at 447-48.
136. The court ruled that the validating statutes raised by the city were either inapplica-
ble, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 974d-19, -21, -22 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979),
or effective prior to the date the dispute arose, id. arts. 974d-12, -13. 583 S.W.2d at 448.
137. 572 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
138. Id. at 16-17.
139. Id. at 17.
140. 575 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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permitting the annexation to stand. The court held that such a severance
was not possible, because after the invalid parts had been severed there
was not a valid ordinance capable of being enforced and of effecting the
purpose and intent of the city council. 14 ' Finally, the court held that an
unconstitutional ordinance that is not questioned between 1960 and 1976,
when the present suit was brought, is not susceptible to a defense of limita-
tions. The court ruled that "no constitutional ordinance can become valid
simply by going unquestioned for more than four years. 142
B. Disannexation
In City ofHitchcock v. Longmire 43 the Houston (1st District) court of
civil appeals considered whether citizens of a homerule city could repeal
an annexation ordinance by referendum. The court observed that the re-
peal of an annexation ordinance by referendum would operate as a disan-
nexation and should be governed by the rules for disannexation defined in
articles 970a'4 and 1175(2).' 41 Pursuant to article 970a and to the city
charter, only a majority of the qualified voters of the annexed area may
initiate the disannexation procedure; thus, a popular referendum of the
city's voters would be ineffective to repeal the ordinance.
46
A similar result was reached in Vara v. City of Houston, 47 in which the
Houston (14th District) court of civil appeals determined that the disan-
nexation procedure has been withdrawn by the legislature from the initia-
tory process and that the parties seeking the disannexation had failed to
comply with either article 970a, the Municipal Annexation Act,'48 or arti-
cle 1266, allowing disannexation of unimproved territory of minimum
acreage contiguous to the city boundary. 149 Accordingly, the court ruled
that a writ of mandamus to compel a referendum was properly denied.15°
141. Id. at 61.
142. Id.
143. 572 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
144. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a (Vernon 1963 & Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
145. Id. art. 1175(2) (annexation and disannexation procedures may be established in the
city charter so long as consistent with article 970a).
146. 572 S.W.2d at 127.
147. 583 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
148. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a (Vernon 1963 & Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
149. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1266 (Vernon 1963). The court appears to ignore
the second prong of this provision that allows the discontinuance of improved territory in
cities with a population of 596,000 or more. 583 S.W.2d at 938.
150. 583 S.W.2d at 939.
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